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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES A. CHRYSLER, 
-vs.-
GRACE CHRYSLER, 
Plaintiff & 
Appellant, 
Defendant & 
Res·pondent. 
Case 
No. 8515 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPElLAN\T 
The parties will be referred to as they appeared be-
low, the appellant herein being the plaintiff, and the 
respondent, the defenda n't. 
The figures in parentheses refer to the page number 
of the Record; when preceded by the abbreviation Tr., 
reference is to the transcript of the testimony. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint for Divorce against the 
defendant in the District Court of Grand County, State of 
U:tah, on the 21st d·ay of April, 1955 (1 ). Defendant, on 
the 27th day of April, 1955 filed her Answer and Coun-
terclaim thereto (5-7}. Defendant filed a reply to said 
Coun·terclaim on the 12th day of May, 1955 (1 0). 
Plaintiff's attorney at the outset of this case and 
at the time of ~the entry of the Decree herein was Maxwell 
Bentley, Esquire, of Moab, Utah. Shortly after the Decree 
was entered, Mr. Bentley withdrew as plaintiff's counsel. 
Plaintiff then employed Edward Sheya, of Price, Utah, to 
represent him in proceedings to set aside the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce in the 
Trial court. From an adverse ruling therein, said attorney 
was employed to prosecuie this appeal. 
During the pendency of this action, the plaintiff be-
came a resident of the State of Nevada. A trial setting 
herein was made for November 28, 1955 at 10 A. M. 
wi·th the concurrence of plaintiff's former attorney, Max-
well Bentley, and Hanson and Ruggeri, attorneys for de-
fendant. Said setting was made in plaintiff's absence 
while he was in Nevada. Plaintiff was engaged in the 
cons,fruction business, and was performing such work in 
Nevada at said time (Tr. 20}. Mr. Bentley sent a letter to 
plaintiff prior to November 28, 1955, wherein he advised 
plaintiff that said case was to be heard November 28, 
1955 at 10 o'clock A.M. at Moab, Utah (PI's Exh. 2 p. 1) 
The said letter was addressed to the plaintiff in care of 
Joseph P. Holler, his Nevada attorney, at Suite 1, Mason-
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'• 
... 
ic Building, Reno, Nevada. The said Joseph P. Holler 
was at said time plaintiff's attorney in connection with 
ano'ther action filed in Nevada. (PI's Exh. 2). Said let'ter 
was not opened by attorney Haller for the reason thal it 
was addressed to said plaintiff in care of said attorney 
and said attorney was not authorized 'to open said mail. 
(PI's Exh. 2). He caused said letter to be filed in his office 
until such time as plaintiff came to his office. By coinci-
dence, on November 28, 1955, at about 10:30 A. M. 
Reno, Nevada time, p·laintiff happened to come to at-
torney Holler's office and said attorney then handed him 
said letrter. The plaintiff opened it in the presence of said 
attorney and for the first time was apprized of said trial 
date (PI's Exh. 2 pp. 1-2). There is one hour's differ-
ence between Reno, Nevada time and Moab, Utah time; 
tha·t 1 0:30 A. M. Reno, Nevada time would be 11 :30 A. 
M. Moab, Utah time; plaintiff first learned of said trial 
date approximately one and one-half hours affer the 
hearing was scheduled 'to and did commente (PI's Exh. 2) 
The trial Court heard the defendant's evidence on her 
counterclaim on November 28, 1955, commencing at 10 
A. M., awarded iudgment against the plaintiff, and re-
cessed at 10:30 A. M. on said date, all in ·the absence of 
both p·laintiff and his a·ttorney (21 ). When plaintiff open-
ed said lefter on November 28, 1955 at 10:30 A.M. Reno 
time (11 :30 A. M. Moab time) it was too late to procure 
counsel to appear for him at said trial. He didn't know 
until later on said day that his attorney of record, Mr. 
Bentley, was in Wyoming when the hearing took place. 
Plaintiff caused a telephone call to be placed to the of-
fice of his said at'torney upon opening said letter, by at-
3 
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torney Haller, which call was answered by one Kline D. 
Strong, who shared a telephone line with attorney Bent-
ley at Moa·b (PI's Exh. 3). Mr. Strong was asked by 
Mr. Haller to find out what disposition had been made of 
the Chrysler case and to call him back. Strong contacted 
Veone Dalton, Clerk of the District Court of Grand County 
and later advised the plaintiff by telephone that judg-
ment in the case had already been entered against Mr. 
Chrysler {PI's Exh. 3). From Mr. Kline's written 
statement, {PI's Exh. 3), it appears there was some 
understanding between Mr. Bentley and the plaintiff that 
Mr. Bentley was to try to get a postponement of this case, 
until some future time, but it does not appear therefrom 
until what date. Since plaintiff did not know of the set-
ting of November 28, 1955, and a postponement was 
mentioned to Mr. Strong after knowledge of this trial 
date, the postponement must have been contemplated 
for some date beyond the date finally agreed upon by the 
respective attorneys. 
By reason of the above and foregoing, plaintiff did 
not have an opportunity to attend said hearing, nor did 
he have an opportunity to present any evidence before 
the trial Court, nor to contact counsel in time to attend 
said hearing or to request the trial Court to allow plain-
tiff sufficient time to attend said hearing and to give tes-
timony at the same. Plaintiff was prevented from attend-
ing said hearing through no fault of his own, and was 
free from any negligence in connection therewith {38). 
The Court below on January 4, 1956, about 5 weeks 
after the hearing, entered Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and a Decree in favor of the defendant (22-
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33), awarding her a lump sum judgment of $5,000.00 
payable forthwith, together with monthly sums of 
$100.00 per month, commencing December 1, 1955, to 
continue as long as defendant remained unmarried, all 
for and as alimony (30). Said lump sum was made the 
first lien upon cerltain real property consisting of a num-
ber of uranium claims, more particularly described in said 
Decree (30, 31, 32). Defendant was furt'her awarded the 
fol'lowing property, to-wit: One deep freezer, one 1953 
Mercury Sedan, one 1954 Fleetwood 21 foot house trail-
er, together with certain personal effects, wearing ap-
parel and ornaments, together with the sum of $200.00 
as an attorney's fee for defendant's attorneys (33). Said 
lump sum of $5,000.00 was awarded to defendant not-
withstanding the fact that she did not specifically pray 
for the same in her counterclaim (6, 7), and the evidence 
fails to sustain the same. The findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and Decree herein were filed in the of-
fice of 1the Clerk of Grand County, Utah, on January 4, 
1956 (22, 29). 
Plaintiff made a Motion to set aside said Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of law and Decree filed February 
9, 1956 (37). A hearing was had thereon before the 
Honorable F. W. Keller, District Judge, on February 27, 
1956 (45). Said Court, on said date, made an order deny-
ing said Motion, without preiudice. The formal order was 
signed March 7, 1956 and filed March 9, 1956 (47). 
Notice of the las·t Order was served on March 8, 1956 
and filed March 9, 1956 (48). It is from said Order that 
plaintiff prosecutes this Appeal. 
5 
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It is conceded that the plaintiff had taken up resi-
dence in the State of Nevada pending the trial setting 
and hearing in this action. He had retained counsel in ·the 
State of Utah to prepare the case for trial and to notify 
him of the date the maitter would be heard. The case had 
been pending from the 21st day of April, 1955 to the 
28th day of November, 1955, the day it was heard in 
plaintiff's absence. In the interim, plaintiff's business in-
terests 'took him to the State of Nevada. As aforesaid, he 
was engaged in the construction business and said busi-
ness took him to various states·. He had lived in the States 
of California (Tr. 35), Utah (Tr. 4), Nevada (Tr. 34), and 
now resides in Colorado (Tr. 36), where he is following 
the same vocation. Although he intended to return to the 
State of Utah 1to prosecute this action, as soon as he was 
no·tified of the date of trial, while he was in Nevada and 
after having established residence there, he filed an ac-
tion for Divorce in that State against the defendant (Def's 
Exh. 4). Plaintiff did no1t thereby intend to, nor did 
he abandon the Utah action. This position is substantiat-
ed by the fact that he continued to retain the services of 
his attorney, Maxwell Bentley, to represent him in the 
Utah action. Plaintiff was expecting to receive notice 
from said attorney as to the date of trial. Mr. Bentley 
did send written notice thereof, wh·ich did not come to 
plaintiff's attention in time for reasons stated above (PI's 
Exh. 2). Plaintiff caused a telephone call to be p'laced 
immediately to Mr. Bentley upon opening the le,tter from 
the latter notifying him of the trial date (PI's Exh. 3). 
Plaint'iff through attorney Holler requested Mr. Strong 
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to ascertain the status of this case and to notify him 
(PI's Exh. 3). Mr. Strong did so, as aforesaid. Such 
solicitude on the pat4t of the plaintiff does not evince 
any intention whatsoever on his part to abandon this 
case. His reasons for filing an action in Nevada do not 
appear in the Record, because plaintiff has never had the 
opportunity to appear before the trial Court and present 
his side of the case. The trial Court was urged to set 
aside the Findings and Decree herein, 'in order to permit 
the plaintiff to enlighten 1the Court on all pertinent mat-
ters in connection with this case. His motion was denied. 
Plaintiff has never had his day in Court with res·pect to 
this action. Through no fault or negligence of his own, 
the plaintiff has been deprived of an opportunity of pre-
senting his evidence in support of his Comp·laint to the 
trial Court. All he has reques:ted and now requests is that 
he be accorded such an opportunity, which would be in 
accordance with ius·tice, equity and fair play. 
The Record in this case is uncontroverted on the 
proposition that plain~iff learned too late of the setting 
date of this action. It is true that his attor~_L_ Bentl_~r_~----~·{ 
knew of said date, and tha·t he attemped to communicate 
the same to the plaintiff. Mr. Holler, in his Affidavit, in 
evidence herein, explains the circumstances surrounding 
the receipt of Mr. Bentley's letter by him and states it 
was unopened until plaintiff came to his office November 
28, 1955, at about 10:30 A. M. Reno time (PI's Exh. 2), 
and the same remains uncontradicted. Said Affidavit un-
equivocal'ly points out why it was physically impossible 
for plaintiff to be present at said hearing in Moab, and 
that plaintiff tried in vain to contact his a·ttorney, Mr. 
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Bentley, as soon as he opened said letter and learned for 
the first time of the date of said hearing. 
There is no evidence in the Record impeaching the 
facts set forth in said Affidavit, and upon the basis there-
of, plaintiff was deprived of the opportunity to be heard 
in said case by circumstances wholly beyond his control, 
and wi~thout any fault on his part. Under such facts and 
circumstances plaintiff avers it was an abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial Court to deny plaintiff's Motion 
to set as'ide said Findings and Conclusions and Decree. 
The ques~tion before this Court is, Should the plain-
tiff be denied his day in Court, because he did not learn 
of the trial date in time to be present and to give testi-
mony thereat, in view of all the above circumstances? 
There is no evidence that he had actual knowledge of the 
trial setting until after judgment had been entered. He 
used due diligence upon first learning belatedly thereof. 
His affidavit states that he would have attended said 
hearing had he seasonably received notice thereof; that 
he had a meritorious cause of action which he was pre-
venlted from presenting through no fault of his own (37-
41 incl.). 
SPECIFICATIO'N OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
1. The Court was without jurisdiction to enter judg-
ment in this case. 
2. The Court abused its discretion in denying plain-
tiff's Motion to Set Aside Divorce Decree. 
BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT 
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1. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING A DECREE 
OF DIVORCE HEREIN FOR LACK 0'F JURISDICTIONAL 
FACTS. 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DIVORCE DECREE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OiF THIS CASE, THUS ABUSING ITS 
DISCRETION. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING A DECREE 0'F 
DIVORCE HEREI'N FO,R LACK 0'F JURISDICTIONAL 
FACTS. 
Sec. 30-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provides, among other things, " ... and the 
Court may decree a dissolution of the marriage contract 
between the plaintiff and defendant in al'l cases where 
the plaintiff shall have been an actual and bona fide resi-
dent of this state and of the county where the action is 
brought for three months next prior to the commencement 
of the action ... " (Emphasis mine). 
I submit that the on'ly evidence touching directly 
on the subiect of residence is found on page 4 of the 
Transcript of the Reporter, commencing on line 15, to-wit: 
"Q. Now during the, this complaint was filed on the 
11th day of April, A. D. 1955. How long have you 
been a resident of Grand County, you and your hus-
band, prior to that time? 
A. We first came out two years ago in November. 
Q. In November of 1953? 
9 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And you have been a resident of Grand County, 
State of Utah, three months before the commencement 
of this action against you, is that right? 
A. Yes." (Transcript p. 4, lines 15-24). (Note: The com-
plaint was actually filed April 21, 1955. The ten day 
summons was served April 11, 1955) (3, 4). 
The above is the sum and substance of defendant's 
testimony as to residence in the State of Utah, and the 
County of Grand, for the purpose of securing a divorce 
from plaintiff on her counterclaim. It does not meet the 
requirements of our statute, to-wit: Sec. 30-3-1, U.C.A. 
1953, as amended. There is no evidence that defendant 
was an actual and bona fide resident of this state for 
one year, and of the County of Grand for three months 
next prior to the commencement of the action. Defend-
ant's tes·timony :that she and her husband first came to 
Utah two years ago in November (November, 1953) does 
not fullfill the statutory requirements cited. Defendant's 
testimony does no~t show that either she or her husband 
were actual and bona fide residents of this state for one 
year nex·t prior to the commencement of this action, nor 
does it show tha~t either or both of them were actual and 
bona fide residents of Grand County for three months 
next prior to the commencement of the action. Defend-
ant's evidence simply is that she and her husband first 
came out to Utah two years ago in November {which 
would be November, 1953). There is no testimony that 
they came out for the purpose of estab·lishing residence 
in Urta·h or that they, or either of them, have been actual 
and bona fide residents of this State since November of 
1953, or one year next prior to the date of the commence-
10 
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ment of said action. Since this matter goes to the ques-
~tion of iurisdiction, it is vital that the evidence clearly 
show the requisite period of actual and bona fide resi-
dence next prior to the commencement of the action. 
It does not do so. Jurisdiction can not be pres·umed, 
waived, nor conferred. Not only does the evidence fail to 
show bona fide and actual residence for the requisite 
period, but there is no showing that the claimed residence 
of either party was next prior to the date of the com-
mencement of !the action. 
Furthermore, as to residence in the County of Grand, 
defendant was asked merely if she had been a resident of 
Grand County three months before the commencement of 
the action against her (Emphasis mine). (Tr. p. 4, lines 
21-23). She was not asked whether she was an actual 
and bona fide resident, or whether she had been such 
three months next prior to the commencement of the 
action. This is very important, because, as the question 
was put, defendant could well have been a resident of 
Grand County for three months at any time before the 
commencement of the action, but not necessarily next 
prior theretto, and still she could have answered the ques-
tion put to her in the affirmative. Suppose she had resided 
in Grand County from November, 1953 to December 31, 
1954, but had abandoned s·aid residence on the latter 
date. Since the question put to her was whether she had 
resided in Grand County three months before (no·t next 
prior) to April 11, 1955, the da'te 1the action was started, 
she could ~truthfully answer "yes" to said question, but 
this would not entitle her to a divorce because said resi-
dence, according to our statute, must be three months 
next prior to ,fhe date the action is started. Yet, the only 
1 1 
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testimony in the record relative to defendant's residence 
in Grand Couny is that she resided there three months 
before the commencement of the action against her. This 
showing clearly does not conform to the requirements 
of said Sec. 30-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and the 
Court was without jurisdiction to award defendant a 
divorce upon this evidence. There was no attempt made 
to clarify or explain the residence of the defendant to 
show that it v1as actual and bona fide for the requisite 
period, or to show that it was next prior to the date the 
action was commenced. This omission on the all-import-
ant and decisive question of jurisdiction is fatal to defend-
ant's action, and we urge this Court rto dismiss said action 
for lack of jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, it was in-
cumbent upon defendant to prove that either she or 
plaintiff complied with our statutory residence require-
ments in order to procure a divorce on her counterclaim. 
Weiss V. Weiss Ill U. 353, 179 P. 2nd 1005. 
It has also been held that the matter of residence in a 
divorce action is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by 
the parties. Branch V. Branch, 30 Colo. 499, 71 P. 632. 
The evidence must support a finding as to residence 
for the requisite period. Even though there is an allega-
tion of such residence in the Complaint and an admission 
of such residence in the answer, the same is not sufficient, 
si nee the fact of residence is a jurisdictional prerequisite, 
and the evidence must affirmatively show the required 
residence. See People V. District Court, (Colo.), 258 P. 
2nd, 483. 
In the case at bar, Defendant in her counterclaim 
12 
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alleged: 
"1. Defendant is a resident of Grand Coun·ty, State 
of Utah, and has been for more than three months prior 
to the filing of plaintiff's complaint herein" (6). It will be 
noted that defendant did no1 allege such residence as 
being actual and bona fide, nor that it was next prior to 
the commencement of said action (6). Plaintiff admiUed 
said allegation in his reply (1 0). 
Therefore, neither the defendant's counterclaim, 
nor the evidence above cited, conform to the require-
men~ts of Section 30-3-1 U.C.A., 1953, as amended, to 
confer the necessary iurisdiction to enable the court to 
grant a divorce. See People V. District Court, supra. 
In Hampshire V. Hampshire, 70 Idaho 522, 223 P. 
2nd 950, 21 ALR 2nd 1159, under Sec. 32-701, IC, which 
provides: "A divorce must not be granted unless the p·lain-
tiff has been a resident of the state for six full weeks 
next preceding the commencement of the action," the 
Idaho court said, "To constitute a residence within the 
meaning of the divorce statute, !there must be a habita-
tion or abode in a particular place, for the required time, 
and an intention to remain there permanently or indefin-
itely. An actual residence as dis~tinguished from a con-
structive one is required. 17 Am. Jur. 280; 27C.J.S. Di-
vorce, Sec. 76, p. 644; Wood V. Wood 140 Ark. 361,215 
s.w. 681." 
The Idaho statute cited in ~the Hamps·hire case above 
did not require "actual" residence, but the court held 
actual residence as distinguished from a constructive one 
is required. Our Utah sta1tute contains the words "actual" 
13 
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and "bona fide" residence. 
In the present case, neither "actual" nor .. bona 
fide'' residence is shown. There was no effort to show 
residence of the required kind, and certainly it was not 
shown that there was the residence required by the stat-
ute for the three month period nex.t prior to the com-
mencement of the action. 
In Weiss V. Weiss, supra, the trial court found, 
among other things, that the plaintiff had not been an 
actual, bona fide resident of the county and state for the 
required statutory time. A decree of "no cause of action" 
was entered agains:t the plaintiff and he was ordered to 
pay the defendant $729.00 for the expenses of the suit, 
temporary alimony and attorney's fees. The first question 
this court was caNed upon to decide was whether or not 
the trial court erred in deciding the merits of the case 
after it had found that the plaintiff did not have the resi-
dence required by the statute to empower the court to 
grant a divorce. 
In the course of its opinion, this court said: "The 
subiect matter of a divorce action is the status of mar-
riage existing between the plaintiff and defendant. The 
distridt courts of this state have iurisdiction of divorce 
generally, but do not have iurisdiction of the status of 
marriage existing between every husband and wife ... 
.. The pronouncement by the Legis·lature that 'the 
courtt may decree a dissolution of the marriage contract 
... where the plaintiff shall have been an actual and 
bona fide resident of this state and of the county where 
the action is brought for three months next prior to the 
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commencement of the action' es1tablishes some of the pre-
requisites to the district court obtaining iurisdiction 
of the status of marriage exis'ting between the plain-
tiff and defendant in a particular divorce action. The 
above quoted sentence stating that 'the court may decree 
a dissolution of the marriage contract', e'tc. by implica-
tion also states that the court may not (shall not) decree 
a dissolution of the marriage conltract where the plain-
tiff shall not have been an actual and bona fide resident 
of this state and of the county where the action is brought 
for three monrths next prior to the commencement of the 
action. This is a limitation on the power of the court to act 
in respect to the marriage contract and the marriage sta-
tus ensuing therefrom. If the court finds that there was an 
actual and bona fide residence as specified, it has the 
power to dissolve or refuse to dissolve the contract, de-
pending on what it concludes as to the merits of the case. 
If it finds that there was not such residence, it has no 
power to further act as to the marriage contract and if 
it acts in such regard it exceeds i,ts authority." 
In the case at bar, the court could not find from the 
evidence that either the plaintiff or the defendan;t had 
been an actual and bona fide resident of the county and 
s'tate for three months next prior ~to the commencement of 
the action because the evidence does not show any such 
residence. It is, therefore, plaintiff's contention tha1t the 
court had no power to act because i't had acquired no 
iurisdiction and when it did act the court acted wholly 
without authority. 
II 
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THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MO-
TION TO SET ASIDE DIVORCE DECREE UNDER THE CIR-
CUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THUS ABUSING ITS DIS-
CRETION. 
Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provides, in part: "Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable 
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On mo-
tion and upon such terms as are iust, 'the court may in 
the furtherance of iustice relieve a party or his legal rep-
resentative from a final iudgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise or excusable neglect; ... " 
Plaintiff's affidavit herein sets forth that he has a 
meritorio-li~Cause of action herefnQ (39). The same has not 
been disputed. The Findings and Decree herein were filed 
January 4, 1956. Plaintiff made his motion to set aside 
the same on February 9, 1956. 
"Where timely relief is sought from a default iudg-
ment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, 
if any, should be resolved in favor of the motion to set 
aside the iudgment so that cases may be decided on 
their merits." Moore's Fed. Practice, Vol. 7, p. 224. 
The iudgment taken herein was in the absence of 
the plaintiff and is in the nature of a default. 
In Bylund V. Crook, 60 U. 285, 208 P. 504, although 
this court held tha't no reasonable grounds existed to set 
aside lthe default iudgment, the court further stated: "Our 
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trial courts are usually very liberal in vacating and setting 
aside default judgments entered against a defaulting 
partly by reason of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable 
neglect, or in case where there has been fraud or decei~t 
practiced. Under our prac:tice it is generally regarded as 
an abuse of discre·tion for a trial court not to vacate and 
set oside a default iudgment where there is any reason-
able ground for doing so, and timely application is 
made." {Emphasis mine). 
In Cutler V. Haycock, 32 U. 354, 90 P. 897, sum-
mons was served upon the defendant and he sent the 
same to his attorney about 50 miles away. The at;torney 
prepared a demurrer and caused it to be served on plain-
tiff's attorney by leaving a copy at his residence with his 
v1ife, the attorney being absent, on the last day allowed 
for service, and on the same day mailed the demurrer 
with proof of service attached to the Clerk of the Court, 
but it did not reach 'the clerk until after the default had 
been entered against the defendant. Before judgment, 
defendant requested plaintiff's attorney to call the 
cou~t's attention to the demurrer. Plaintiff's attorney re-
fused, offered proof and took judgment. 
While our court states that the default and judg-
ment were entered herein as of strict legal right, the main 
ques1tion in the court's opinion was, Should the default 
and judgment have been set aside by the District Court 
upon the showing made by appellant? The court points 
out the general rule that whether a defaulrt and judg-
ment should or should no't be vacated is one to be passed 
upon by the trial court, and that it res1ts wit'hin its sound 
discretion is elementary. The court then says, "It is equal-
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ly elementary that this discretion is to be applied to the 
facts as they appear in each case, and, in the exercise of 
this discretion, the aim and obiect should be the promo-
tion and furtherance of iustice and the protection of the 
rights of all concerned. As has been well said, in all 
doubtful cases the general rule of courts is 'to incline to-
wards granting relief from default, and to bring about 
a iudgment on the merits. (Ci.ting authorities). This rule, 
as it appears from the authorities, is of almost universal 
application, and is defeated only in cases where the de-
fault is the result of inexcusable neglect of the party in 
default, or where it would be inequitable to set it aside." 
The court after sta·ting that appellant's conduct was 
not without some excuse due to the sparsely se'ttled 
country where none of the modern facilities or conveni-
ences for communication are shown to exis:t, and the at-
torney and client lived abou't 50 miles apart, etc., says 
further: "Upon the other hand, there is not the slightest 
intimation that the responden't would have suffered 
either inconvenience or 'loss of any kind by setting aside 
the default. If costs are involved, the court can always 
protect against those. This is not a case where a party 
at grea1t expense and sacrifice of time had prepared for 
trial, and would be compel'led to undergo it all again if 
the other party is permitted to defend; nor does it present 
a case where any evidence has been lost to the prevail-
ing party." 
Again, the court says: .. Law and courts alike abhor 
a result that condemns a party unheard, and, unless the 
law unavoidably requires and iustice demands it, where 
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a party has not by his own inexcusable neglect deprived 
himself of the right, 'the courts should, and will, where 
equity permits, afford relief, to the end tha't a party may 
be given a hearing." The court directed the distr'ict court 
to vacate the judgment and se't aside the default. 
The court distinguishes this case from Peterson V. 
Crosier, 29 U. 235, 81 P. 860, where the defendant 
answered and was absent from the trial. Appellant's affi-
davit, the court found, :tended to show a deliberate intent 
on the part of appellant to abandon his defense and per-
mi't plaintiff to take judgment against him. He and his 
counsel were advised that the case would be called for 
trial on the day for which it was set, but instead of pre·· 
paring and appearing for trial, he showed indifference 
which is wholly inexcusable. 
Plaintiff contends the case at bar is similar to the 
facts and circumstances set forth in Cutler V. Haycock, 
supra, except tha~t plaintiff herein had filed his comp·laint 
and reply to defendant's counterclaim, but for reasons 
beyond his control, did not learn of the trial se,~ting in 
time to be present at the hearing. He wanted to be pres-
ent and introduce evidence in his behalf. He had retained 
counsel :to prepare for trial and 'to advise him of the trial 
date. He did not show indifference nor did he a'bandon 
the case, but was waiting to hear from his attorney as to 
the trial date, and without his fault or negligence, he re-
ceived the letter of notification of the trial date too late 
to be present for the hearing. This was excusable neglect 
end surprise entitling him to set aside the Findings and 
Decree and to be heard. Furthermore, defendant in the 
case at bar will not suffer any loss by having a hearing 
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on the meri1t's. The court can impose terms, if necessary. 
Plaintiff's counsel stipulated at the hearing of the Motion 
that the cou~t could do so if it saw fit (Tr. 30). 
In Quealy V. Willardson, 35 U. 414, 100 P. 930, 
plaintiff brought a friendly mortgage foreclosure suit to 
aid defendant mortgagors in settling a third person's 
claim, which was accomplished. The suit lay dormant for 
about six years by reason of a dispute over plaintiff's at-
torney fee and a question of interest. At the end of that 
time, s·ince no answer was filed, plaintiff took a default 
iudgment for the unpaid part of the debt and attorney's 
fees. Defendants moved to set aside the default, tender-
ing an answer denying the default and alleging payment. 
Held, the motion was improperly overruled, especi-
ally since it appears that plaintiff suffered no iniury 
through the delay and can suffer none by a trial on the 
merits. 
Plaintiff calls attention to the case of Utah Commer-
cial & Savings Bank V. Trumbo (Utah) 53 P. 1033. This 
action was to recover on a promissory note. Defendant's 
attorneys had previously withdrawn from the case and no 
answer had been filed during the statutory period, and 
iudgment was entered. A motion was made to set aside 
the default and permit the defendant to file an answer 
and cross-complaint. This motion was denied. From the 
affidavits filed in support of said mot·ion, it appeared that 
during aU of the proceedings, including the entry of de-
fault and iudgment, the defendant was continuously ab-
sent from the State of Utah and attending ~to business in-
terests in California. The defendan·t, in his affidavit, stat-
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ed that he had been informed and verily believed that his 
attorneys had entered his appearance in the action and 
believe·d that they had filed the proper pleadings to pro-
tect his rights; that he had no notice of their withdrawal 
from the case or of the en.fry of judgment by default until 
after the judgment had been taken against him; that 
when he learned of the judgment, he wired his a'ttorney 
asking if he had n '1t been attending to the case and re-
questing that he attend to it at once; that the judgment 
was a surprise to the defendant and that his application 
to vaca'te it was based upon his mistake and excusable 
neglect; that after the defendant had verily and fully 
sta·ted the facts ~to his attorney, he was advised he had 
a good and meritorious defense. 
This court, speaking through Justice Bartch, said: "If 
in such a case as is presented in this record, a court of 
justice can grant no relief, then H would seem difficult 
to conceive of a case where a court would be justified in 
granting relief from a judgment by default. Surely, it can-
not be said that a person liable to be sued leaves his 
state at his peril, even when he has employed able coun-
sel to care for his interests, lest perchance a judgment be 
taken by default which will leave him without remedy, 
regardless of any defense he may have. Such is not the 
law, and courts do not favor judgments by defaul1t. The 
policy of the law is that every man shall have his day 
in court before judgment shall be entered against him, 
and where a judgment by default has been entered, and 
within the proper time a good defense to the action in 
which the judgment was rendered is made to appear, 
and it is shown that the default was entered through ex-
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cusable neglect or mistake, the default will be vacat-
ed, and iudgment set aside, to permit a trial on the merits. 
It is true that ordinarily the setting aside of a iudgment by 
default rests within the sound legal discretion of the 
court, and ·the appellate court wi'll not interfere, but 
where, as in this case, it is made clearly to appear :that 
there was such an abuse of discretion, through in·adver-
tence or otherwise, as to render the action erroneous and 
unlawful, the appellate court will control such discretio.n, 
and set aside the i·llegal action. Such discretion does not 
confer upon the court an arbitrary power beyond that of 
review. It is an impartial legal discretion, which cannot be 
employed to the iniury of any subiect, but must be exer-
cised fairly, reasonably, and in accordance with the es-
ta·blished principles of law. The power of the court to set 
aside iudgments by default is recognized and conferred 
in Sec. 3005, Rev. St. 1898, and should be liberally exer-
cised for :the purpose of directing proceedings and trying 
causes upon their substantial merits; and where the cir-
cumstances which led to the default are such as to cause 
the court 'to hesitate, it is better to resolve the doubt in 
favor of the application, so that a trial may be secured 
on the merits.'' 
The court further stated, "In the case at bar the facts 
and circumstances show that it was an unavoidable mis-
fortune to the defendant that he did not know that no 
attorney was representing him in the proceedings which 
led to the entry of iudgment against him until a~ter the 
entry had been made. We are therefore of the opinion 
that the court erred in refusing to vacate the default and 
set aside the iudgment, and in refusing to permit the de-
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fend ant to plead to the merits." 
The case at bar presents even more forceful rea-
sons for setting aside the Findings and Decree because it 
is a divorce action. The Courts have generally held that 
in such an action, a liberal rule for vacating default 
judgments prevails, because the State is interested in t'he 
preservation of the marriage relation. See Rehfuss V. 
Rehfuss, (Calif.) 145 P. 1020, wherein the Court said a 
default judgment of divorce will be set aside on slight 
showing, for the state is a I so interested, being concerned 
wi:th the preservation of the marriage relation. See also 
McBiain V. McBiain, (Calif.) 20 P. 61; Wadsworth V. 
Wadsworth 22 P. 648 (Calif.). 
The p'laintiff in the present case had misfortunes 
simi'lar to defendant in Utah Commercial & Savings Bank 
V. Trumbo, supra. The plaintiff herein had the misfor-
tune of being in Nevada when the case was heard and 
he had likewise employed an attorney, in whom he had 
confidence, to represent him herein. He also had the mis-
fortune of not receiving the letter sent to him by his at-
torney, notifying him of the date set for trial until after 
judgment was entered, and consequently was not pres-
ent at the trial (nor was his attorney) and judgment was 
rendered agains1 him on the defendant's counterclaim. 
As soon as he learned of the trial setting, he immediately 
caused an inquiry to be made as to the status of the case 
and learned that judgment had already been entered 
against him. Therefore, the reasoning of 'the Court in the 
Trumbo case applies with equal, if not greater, force to 
the case at bar. See Thomas V. Morris 8 U. 284, 31 P~, 
446; Capalija V. Kulish, (Ore.) 201 P. 545; Davidson V. 
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Pickens, (Okl·a.) 261 P. 2nd. 872; Lake V. Lake, (Wyo.) 
1 82 P. 2nd, 824. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the writer submits that the trial court 
did not have iurisdiction to grant defendant a divorce on 
her counterclaim for the reason that the evidence does 
not show the requisite statutory residence on the part of 
either the plaintiff or the defendant. However, if this 
were a case where the Court did have iurisdiction to act, 
the plaintiff's showing that without fault or negligence 
on his part, he did not receive notice of the trial setting 
until iudgment had been entered against him; that he 
used due diligence to find out the status of the case im-
mediately upon receiving said notice; thart he had re-
tained counsel to represent him in the action; that coun-
sel did not appear at the trial and w·as in the State of 
Wyoming on the date thereof, which fact plaintiff learn-
ed only after the entry of iudgment, together with the 
fact ·that the plaintiffs· Affidavit shows that he has a 
meritorious cause of action and did move the Court to 
set aside the Findings and Decree and within the period 
provided in rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, all 
ius,tify the granting of plaintiff's Motion to set aside the 
Findings and Decree of the trial court herein. Plaintiff 
submits that the refusal of the Court to s·et aside said 
Findings and Decree, under all of the facts and circum-
stances above set forth, was an abuse of its discretion 
and is against ·the policy of the law which favors the 
principle that every man shall have an opportunity to be 
heard before iudgment is entered against him. 
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The Findings and Decree of the trial courrt should 
be set aside. 
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